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Definitions 
Security: A process to help promote privacy through confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
Privacy: Three main canons: Non-intrusion into personal space, non-interference with 
personal decisions, and control over personal information. 
Personal information: Medical and financial related information and data. 
Bluetooth Low Energy - wireless communication technology to create wireless personal 
area networks (WPANs). Formerly known as Bluetooth Smart. Also known as Bluetooth 
LE, BLE, and BTLE. 
Implantable medical devices: The Active Implantable Medical Device (AIMD) Directive 
90/385/EEC defines an active implantable medical device as "any active medical device 
which is intended to be totally or partially introduced, surgically or medically, into the 
human body or by medical intervention into a natural orifice, and which is intended to 
remain after the procedure". As one of the highest risk categories of device, they are 
subject to rigorous regulatory controls both pre- and post-market.[1] 
Morbidity: The state of being or incident rate of having a disease, illness, injury, or 
sickness 
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CAGR - Compound Annual Growth Rate 
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Abstract 
Technology use in healthcare is an integral part of diagnosis and treatment. The use of 
technology in medical devices and sensors is growing. These devices include implantable 
medical devices, and consumer health and fitness tracking devices and applications. 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is the most commonly used communication method in 
medical devices and sensors. Security and privacy are important, especially in healthcare 
technologies that can impact morbidity. There is an increasing need to evaluate the 
security and privacy of healthcare technology, especially with devices and sensors that 
use Bluetooth Low Energy due to the increasing prevalence and use of medical devices 
and sensors. Therefore, more robust security analysis is needed to evaluate security and 
privacy aspects of medical devices and sensors that use Bluetooth Low Energy. 
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1 Introduction 
In healthcare, medical devices and sensors are used with the intention to improve 
patients' quality of care. This use ranges from diagnosis to treatment to monitoring to 
providing life-sustaining medication and services. Examples include wearable devices 
like Fitbit and heart rate or blood pressure monitors to sophisticated blood glucose 
monitors, insulin pumps, and implantable cardiac devices. 
Medical devices and sensors have become a vital part of healthcare and are used to treat, 
monitor, and measure a person's health and sometimes used to prevent or cure illness or 
disease.   
Many of these medical devices and sensors use wireless communication for 
interoperability employing the latest version of Bluetooth called "Bluetooth Low Energy" 
or simply "BLE." Using BLE for communication provides lower power consumption for 
devices and therefore substantial battery savings. 
With the increased need for healthcare, the need for efficient and cost-effective medical 
services, and rise in health awareness and home healthcare, the use of BLE medical 
devices is also increasing. 
BLE, as with any wireless communication protocol, has potential security risks that can 
affect the security of medical devices and can have consequences to patients' privacy 
ranging from temporary inconvenience to catastrophic failure resulting in death. 
There is a need for more rigorous security and vulnerability assessment process for 
medical devices to promote patient safety and well-being. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Medical devices and sensors in healthcare 
Medical professionals rely on a wide range of medical devices and sensors when 
diagnosing or treating patients. Technology like medical devices and sensors are ideally 
suited to collect, process, store and respond to the amount of data collected, and through 
connections to other health information technology, correlated to assist with diagnosis 
and treatment. 
2.2 Medical device and sensors proliferation 
The use of medical devices and sensors in healthcare is growing and will continue to 
grow. The global medical device market is expected to reach an estimated $409.5 billion 
by 2023, and it is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 4.5% from 2018 to 2023.[2] 
According to Berg Insight, in 2016 there were 7.1 million patients worldwide that are 
remotely monitored using connected medical devices. This number does not include 
personal health tracking devices. Berg Insight estimates that the number of people 
remotely monitored will reach 50.2 million by 2021. [3] 
The 2018 Bluetooth Market Update states: “Medical grade devices are on a steady climb. 
Demand for healthcare providers to better administer medication, diagnose injuries, and 
receive critical updates on their patients’ conditions is driving a 28% CAGR in Bluetooth 
healthcare wearables over the next five years.” [4] 
Tractica predicts that annual wearable device shipments will increase from 85 million 
units in 2015 to 559.6 million units by 2021, representing a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 36.9 percent. [5] ABI Research predicts shipments of just activity trackers 
will top 87 million in 2021. [6] 
3 
Healthcare technology can help to provide solutions to meet this increasing demand. The 
demand for healthcare has outpaced the supply and has contributed to a corresponding 
dramatic increase in the costs of healthcare.  In this environment, there is a growing need 
for more efficient and more economical health-related policies, procedures, and practices, 
and many are looking to technology to help provide solutions.  
The current healthcare system has many issues including a large aging population of 
people (baby boomers) that are now entering the stage where more and more medical 
resources are needed from a system that is already overtaxed and where healthcare 
professionals are already struggling to meet the existing workload.  
It is estimated that 45% of Americans have at least one chronic condition or illness 
requiring medical attention and that two-thirds of the population in the United States is 
overweight or obese which can lead to additional medical issues such as diabetes and 
heart disease.[7] These issues, along with changes in diet and a more sedentary lifestyle, 
have contributed to the increased need for healthcare. 
As these issues with healthcare continue to gain attention, there is also a rise in healthcare 
awareness and involvement as an increasing number of stakeholders join the 
conversation. Individuals, insurance providers, and healthcare organizations are 
becoming more comfortable with technology and are looking for opportunities to 
promote self-managed healthcare. Medical devices and sensors using technology provide 
a way for both clinicians and patients to track everything from quantitative items like 
number of steps, weight, blood pressure, heart rate, and blood glucose to more qualitative 
measurements like mood or mental state and sleep quality. Technology is also being 
adapted and used as an additional channel of patient-doctor communications, 
telemedicine, keeping track of medical records, and prescription refill requests.  
With this attention to health and the rising costs associated with healthcare, technology is 
providing consumers a cost-effective method to monitor, collect and access their own 
medical information and provide healthcare providers additional information in their 
4 
diagnosis and treatment plans. Along with the increased familiarity and use of mobile and 
wireless technology, the use of sophisticated and networked home medical devices has 
increased in recent years. There are several different types of medical devices including 
consumer grade products like blood pressure monitors, personal fitness tracking, glucose 
level monitors, wireless weight scales, and wearable devices for monitoring health 
indicators like Fitbit and Apple Watch. There are also medical grade products called 
implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator 
(ICD) and pacemakers, implantable insulin pumps, and replacement heart implants. A 
recent report released by Markets and Markets forecasts the global connected medical 
device market is projected to reach $2.6703 Billion US dollars by 2023 from $763.1 
Million US dollars in 2017, at a compound annual growth rate of 23.2% from 2018 to 
2023. [8] 
With the Affordable Care Act, the HITECH Act, Meaningful Use, and now the Medicare 
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), there are now financial incentives for 
healthcare workers to use health-related information technology (HIT). From 
healthit.gov: 
The current Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) incentive program 
that encourages health IT adoption is the Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which includes a Quality Payment Program 
(QPP) with multiple clinician payment tracks. Participation in QPP rewards 
clinicians' use of certified health IT. [9] 
2.3 BLE use in medical devices and sensors 
Some of the newest healthcare related systems are wireless devices used in body area 
networks (BANs) employing Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). These BLE devices are 
designed to be low power, efficient and secure for monitoring and wirelessly transmitting 
vitals such as blood pressure, temperature, and insulin levels. BLE specifically targets the 
sports and fitness as well as the health and wellness medical industry. [14] BLE offers 
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prebuilt Health Device Profiles for standardizing communications between BLE health 
related devices. Some of these prebuilt profiles include:  
ECG (heart rate), Blood pressure monitor, Body composition analyzer, Body 
thermometer, body weight scale, carbon monoxide sensor, cardiovascular fitness and 
activity monitor, enuresis sensor, fall sensor, gas sensor, glucose meter, independent 
living activity hub, medication dosing sensor, medication monitor, motion sensor, 
personal emergency response sensor, and pulse oximeter. [10] 
Examples of implantable medical devices include: Implantable cardiac pacemakers, 
Implantable defibrillators, Implantable nerve stimulators, Bladder stimulators, Diaphragm 
stimulators, Cochlear implants, Implantable active drug administration devices, 
Implantable active monitoring devices, Implantable neuro stimulator systems, 
Implantable infusion pumps, Implantable glucose monitors 
One continuous glucose monitor had this to say regarding wireless co-existence and data 
security: 
The t:slim X2 System is designed to work safely and effectively in the presence of 
wireless devices typically found at home, work, retail stores, and places of leisure 
where daily activities occur. See Section 30.11 for more information. The t:slim 
X2 System is designed to accept BluetoothTM Low Energy (BLE) 
communication only from a linked Dexcom G5 Mobile Transmitter. BLE 
communication is not established until you enter the unique Dexcom Transmitter 
ID into your pump. The t:slim X2 System and system components ensure data 
security via proprietary means and ensure data integrity using error checking 
processes, such as cyclic redundancy checks. [11] 
Another IMD uses a similar system of an ICD and a "Smart Reader" that uses proprietary 
communication, then transfers information from the Smart Reader to a smartphone 
(iPhone or Android) via BLE. This system is called the MyCareLink Smart U.S. 
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From the website: 
Medtronic makes it easy for heart device patients to stay connected to their 
doctor. The MyCareLink Smart Monitor for pacemaker patients, including CRT-
P, combines a Reader and an app, making this a convenient way to send heart 
device information remotely to your doctor between clinic visits or whenever 
you’re not feeling well. The app can only be used with a MyCareLink Smart 
Reader, which is prescribed by the patient’s doctor. [12] 
Some examples of wearable (Non-implantable) medical devices include: 
Fitbit 
Fitbit trackers and watches use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology to sync 
with phones, tablets, and certain computers. [13] 
Omron blood pressure monitor - this device uses BLE to communicate with a smartphone 
app to collect and then optionally upload data to other EMR systems. 
Smartphones like Apple iPhone use BLE and collect health data. Consider the Apple 
Health app that collects information such as steps, heart rate, flights of stairs climbed, etc. 
Some examples of non-implantable medical devices are some of the many consumer 
grade devices targeted for sports and health. Two examples taken from the Bluetooth 
website: [14] 
Sports & Fitness 
Bluetooth is responsible for enabling wearables like fitness trackers and smart watches 
that are showing up on wrists everywhere to monitor steps, exercise, activity, and sleep. 
These devices track fitness levels and athletic performance and use Bluetooth technology 
to communicate that information in real-time to athletes, coaches, and trainers. 
Health & Wellness 
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Blood glucose monitors, pulse oximeters, asthma inhalers, and other wearable medical 
devices use Bluetooth technology to help administer medication, diagnose injuries, and 
transmit critical information securely from patients to providers. 
2.4 BLE - general information 
Bluetooth is available in two different radio versions: Low Energy (LE) and Basic 
Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR). Both radio versions operate in the 2.4 GHz ISM 
band and use frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS). 
Bluetooth Low Energy (previously known as Bluetooth Smart) is not compatible with 
Bluetooth Basic Rate (BR) or Bluetooth Enhanced Data Rate (EDR). However, The 
Bluetooth 4.0 specification allows for devices to implement both LE and BR/EDR 
systems. Most modern hardware devices and operating systems are Bluetooth dual mode. 
In addition to the BR/EDR point-to-point connection method, BLE adds two new 
network topologies: broadcast and mesh. BLE uses 40 channels (3 advertising and 37 
data) with 2 MHz spacing. A BLE device will advertise itself by sending a packet on a 
minimum of one of the advertising channels at random intervals. 
Communication is accomplished with a client-server model through attributes with a 
Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) that includes unique identifiers for Characteristics, 
Services, and Descriptors. A characteristic is a data value, a service is a collection of 
characteristics, and a descriptor is additional information about a characteristic. 
In addition to client/server read and write GATT commands, there are server notifications 
where a characteristic (data value) is sent to a client as it becomes available from the 
server, and indications which is the same as a notification additionally requiring a client 
confirmation. 
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2.5 Healthcare technology security risks 
Many consumers and clinicians are eager to adopt and use medical devices and health-
related technologies to promote health and wellbeing. However, while technology can 
help with efficiency and cost issues, there are additional considerations that need to be 
addressed regarding security and privacy. 
Security is defined as a process, not a product, that is used to promote privacy.[15] The 
three pillars of the security process involved people, processes, and technology. When 
applying the security process to people, it is training, awareness, and skills that need 
consideration. Security should also be applied to processes and include management 
systems, frameworks, best practices, and audits. A technology security process 
incorporates prevention, detection, monitoring, and response the security threats. It is this 
technical aspect of security that needs application to medical devices.  
Privacy is defined as: non-intrusion into personal space, non-interference with personal 
decisions, and control over personal information. Personal information is further defined 
as medical and financial related information and data. 
Security is a process and not an end result that is somehow achieved; it is a process that is 
applied to people, policies, and technology to work towards privacy through 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. When addressing security and privacy issues in 
the healthcare field, it is important to understand that in addition to relying on the security 
of technology to ensure privacy, the potential failure of the security process could result 
not only in the loss of privacy but could also compromise patient health and safety. 
Historically, medical devices and information have been siloed and isolated without the 
need of interoperability or communication between devices or with a central repository of 
medical records or information. Medical systems were designed to provide information 
about the patient or consumer and for patient safety from a medical standpoint (within 
prescribed limits of medical best practices), not necessarily for cybersecurity - often 
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lacking methods for monitoring and updating. This is especially true for embedded 
systems that were traditionally stand alone and not networked. For example, consider 
modern implantable medical devices like the Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator that 
routinely uploads logs to physicians and download new settings and updates. In the past 
an ICD was a stand-alone embedded device, but today they are sophisticated network 
connected units that communicate and interoperate with other network devices and 
technologies. 
With this rush for the healthcare industry to adopt technologies, security and privacy 
issues are often overlooked as new technologies are hurriedly put into place in an attempt 
to meet the rapid growth and demand on the healthcare system. If security issues are not 
adequately addressed then there is a possibility of vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
resulting in risk. Some 94 percent  of medical institutions said their organizations have 
been victims of a cyber-attack, according to the Ponemon Institute.[16] 
Moreover, the health sector in 2014 was considered the largest public sector for malicious 
attack.  
Trend Micro's Numaan Huq found that over the past decade, medical organizations make 
up nearly 30 percent of all observed enterprise hacks Analysis of 10 years of cyber-attack 
data points to health care as being the industry most breached.[17]. From the report: 
Although retailers have suffered many losses because of data breaches, the most 
affected industry was actually the healthcare sector, accounting for more than a 
fourth of all breaches (26.9%) this past decade. The second was the education 
sector (16.8%) followed by government agencies (15.9%). Retailers only come in 
fourth place with 12.5%. [17] 
2.5.1 High profile cases 
There have been several high profile cases involving security issues and medical devices. 
Take for example the team consisting of researchers from University of Massachusetts at 
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Amherst and University of Washington in collaboration with Beth Israel Deaconess 
Hospital and Harvard Medical School that were able to remotely access and disable a 
cardiac implantable medical device. [18] 
Another prominent example of an implantable medical device being hacked is described 
in the case of a security researcher (and diabetic) hacking his own insulin pump and 
continuous glucose monitor (CGM) in the paper "Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and 
Insulin: Breaking the Human SCADA System" [19] The security researchers describes a 
method for intercepting, decoding, and then changing wireless communications between 
the Johnson & Johnson insulin pump and the external remote control that would allow for 
a potentially fatal injection of insulin.  
In another example of medical device security issues, a June 2017 report by the Health 
Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force, a single piece of legacy technology equipment 
contained more than 1,400 vulnerabilities. [20] 
While the probability of a normal user being unknowingly hacked using the sophisticated 
methods described in these research papers, it does illustrate that there is a potential issue 
with the security process on at least some medical devices. It is clear that the use of 
technology in healthcare is on the rise and that the use of technology includes security 
and privacy issues that need to be addressed, especially when it pertains to medical 
devices. The risk of loss of human lives due to security vulnerabilities in medical 
technology needs to addressed and mitigated. 
2.6 Security and privacy in healthcare 
Security and privacy in healthcare is important to protect a patient's medical and financial 
information, but they are especially in healthcare technology that can impact morbidity. 
Traditionally, security and privacy in healthcare is focused on protecting personally 
identifiable information or personal health information, rather than addressing a much 
larger need of promoting the concept of security as a process.  
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As the name implies, personally identifiable information is any data that can identify a 
person. Certain information like full name, date of birth, address and biometric data are 
always considered PII. [21] Personal health information includes anything used in a 
medical context that can identify patients 
HIPAA goes beyond PII security best practices in its requirements for partner 
organizations. Under the HIPAA privacy rule, health care providers have considerable 
legal liability for breaches caused by business associates. 
There is also a very real threat of PHI being stolen. Medical data is valuable. According 
to Forbes: [22] 
"On the black market, the going rate for your social security number is 10 cents. 
Your credit card number is worth 25 cents. But your electronic medical health 
record (EHR) could be worth hundreds or even thousands of dollars." 
“We really need to invest in privacy and security, and also be incredibly 
transparent with people about what’s being shared with whom, so that they can 
make the right decisions about what they want to do with their data,” John Moore, 
medical director at Fitbit (and previously the co-founder and CEO of Twine 
Health before its recent acquisition), said during the panel. 
Side channel attacks use information from a system divulged from the nature of the 
system rather than a weakness or vulnerability in the system itself. For example: deriving 
an undisclosed military base from locational data in a fitness app. 
Recent months have certainly highlighted data security openings across healthcare, with 
hospitals and their troves of patient data becoming an increasingly appealing target to 
hackers. 
Consumer fitness and health devices weren’t off the hook either, as Strava’s fitness app 
was recently shown to not only betray the locations of US military bases and patrol 
routes, but also allow anyone to de-anonymize user-shared data to reveal names, speeds, 
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and heart rates. In 2016, Fitbit itself was the target of a cyber attack that collected email 
address, usernames, and, of note, user GPS data. [23] 
With interconnected medical devices and sensors, the concern now includes traditional 
network security issues include confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and 
services. These security issues are detected, prevented, and mitigated with the process of 
monitoring and response to security threats. 
Confientiality of communications and data is achieved through encryption so that the 
information can only be read be the intended reciever. Integrity of commincations, data 
and devices assures that no changes have occurred. Resources, data, and devices should 
also be availabile when requested or needed and resistant to resource depletion. 
For example, consider the need for valid data and information from a medical sensor to 
the accurate diagnoses and treatment of a patient. Without confidentiality that data could 
be read by a third party and this would violate the principles of privacy. If integrity 
checks are insufficient then the data could also possibly be intercepted and altered. When 
demands on device resources such as communication bandwidth are not handled fairly 
then a rogue device can repeatedly make requests for resources and impact legitimate use.  
Neglecting security issues such as confidentiality, integrity and availability has the 
potential to affect patient morbidity ranging from negligible inconvenience or temporary 
discomfort to catastrophic resulting in a patient's death. From FDA Postmarket 
Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: [24] 
Assessing Severity of Patient Harm 
Manufacturers should also have a process for assessing the severity of patient 
harm if the cybersecurity vulnerability were to be exploited. While there are many 
potentially acceptable approaches for conducting this type of analysis, one such 
approach may be based on qualitative severity levels as described in 
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ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010: Medical Devices – Application of Risk 
Management to Medical Devices: 
Common Term: Possible Description 
Negligible: Inconvenience or temporary discomfort 
Minor: Results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring professional 
medical intervention 
Serious: Results in injury or impairment requiring professional medical 
intervention 
Critical: Results in permanent impairment or life-threatening injury 
Catastrophic: Results in patient death 
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3 Problem Statement 
There is an increasing need to evaluate the security and privacy of healthcare technology, 
particularly medical devices and sensors that use BLE. In an ideal world, technology 
works to make our lives easier and more efficient, and we would not need to be 
concerned about software bugs, cyber security, system failures, malicious or even 
unintentional attacks. Communications over both wired and wireless networks would 
maintain confidentiality, integrity and be available when needed, especially when dealing 
with personal information and where there is an expectation of privacy. 
However, technology develops at a rate faster than our ability to keep up with testing for 
safety. Coupled with the increase in personal health awareness, healthcare costs, 
healthcare scope and scale, and the fact that medical information is so distinctly personal 
information, the security of healthcare-related technology has become an increasingly 
large target and concern for healthcare workers, security professionals, and everyday 
people who are the consumers of healthcare-related technology products. 
Consider some of the trends in healthcare that show a dramatic increase towards home-
based and telemedicine that rely on secure technology for monitoring, data collection and 
analysis, and medical decision support systems. This increased use of technology has 
risks not only to financial and medical data, but also directly to a person's welfare, health, 
and well-being.  
Doctors, nurses, clinical staff, healthcare workers are medical experts, not technology 
experts. Medical professionals already have too much to do, not enough time to do it. 
Their primary responsibility is to diagnose and treat patients. However, too much of their 
time is spent dealing with clinical workflow, especially when trying to get data in an 
electronic health record (EHR) system. This problem is only made worse when medical 
devices use proprietary software that lacks interoperability and won’t communicate with 
other systems. 
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Patients put a considerable amount of trust in physicians and healthcare professionals. 
Physicians rely on technology to diagnose and treat patients. There is a need to have 
technology just work and not have to worry about potential privacy issues or spend 
additional time attempting to mitigate security risks when using technology. 
The general public also has a lack of technology and cybersecurity literacy - people do 
not fully understand the ramifications of technology security or lack thereof. People are 
willing to accept a loss of privacy in exchange for convenience. This lack of 
understanding and need for convenience has created a blasé attitude toward security 
breaches and resulting privacy violations.  
From Security Tradeoffs in Cyber Physical Systems: A Case Study Survey on 
Implantable Medical Devices: [25] 
Despite the dangers imposed by cyber-attacks, patients seem to be unaware of 
their effects as they tend to think about the security of their IMDs as a secondary 
aspect. 
Additionally, patients are often unwilling to implement security procedures for a 
multitude of reasons including both perceived and actual properties and falls in the realm 
of Human Computer Interaction (HCI). 
From "Patients, pacemakers, and implantable defibrillators: Human values and security 
for wireless implantable medical devices,'' [26] 
"Developing strong technical security defenses is, however, only part of the 
solution. There is a fundamental gap between developing technical mechanisms 
that could protect the security of future wireless medical devices if deployed and 
developing security defenses that will be accepted (even welcomed) by patients, 
doctors, and other stakeholders." 
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Not enough attention is given to security and privacy of medical devices and sensors, 
because it hasn’t been needed yet. This is due in part to public misperception and overall 
publicity of the risks associated with vulnerabilities. 
As a comparison, consider automotive safety. By 1965, automobile accidents had become 
the leading cause of death of Americans under age 44. [27] Yet, there was no public 
outcry or concern in part due to a lack of visibility. Then automotive safety gained public 
attention largely because of a book written by (a then unknown lawyer named Ralph 
Nader) titled: “Unsafe at any speed”. [28] Public response to this book was powerful and 
almost immediate, and by 1966 the Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act were passed. Automotive safety had become a national 
security issue. [29] 
Despite so many health-related medical devices and sensors there is little research into 
the security and safety of these medical technologies that are being so quickly adopted 
and can so dramatically affect a person's health and safety. Compared to the automotive 
industry, wearable and implantable medical devices do not receive sufficient testing for 
security issues.  
With the proliferation of medical devices, sensors, and mobile applications we have 
entered a new area of cybersecurity threats. This new field of "cyber healthcare" and the 
associated security and privacy issues is more significant to human health, yet the 
mitigation techniques and solutions are far less researched than the other aspects of 
healthcare security. Other sectors that have adapoted and integrated technology such as 
the automotive industry have been recognized as a national safety issue and have 
standardized. [30]  
Currently, the FDA has oversight on medical devices but is not equipped to do extensive 
testing beyond code review.  
The FDA states: [31] 
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“Medical device manufacturers and health care facilities should take steps to 
ensure appropriate safeguards. Manufacturers are responsible for remaining 
vigilant about identifying risks and hazards associated with their medical devices, 
including risks related to cybersecurity. They are responsible for putting 
appropriate mitigations in place to address patient safety risks and ensure proper 
device performance.” 
However, even if a medical device has software code that is free of defects or bugs, and 
the device or sensor operates properly, there are very real security concerns that affect 
security and privacy. Malicious techniques like replay, denial of service, or man in the 
middle attacks pose a very real threat and warrant more thorough testing. 
Due to the fact that BLE uses some of the newest technologies, it is also true that BLE is 
some of the least tested technology. While the FDA requires unit testing on medical 
device before approval for use, this testing cannot anticipate new security attacks and 
methods that are being researched and developed. For example, a recent vulnerability and 
attack was developed for Bluetooth Classic (called BlueBorne) that gave a malicious 
entity complete control over a wireless Bluetooth device. [32] 
What's been done in the past isn’t working in the modern healthcare landscape. Patients 
and doctors are more technology savvy; historically isolated and embedded systems are 
now interconnected; everyone is more health conscientious; the cost of healthcare 
mandates self-managed health solutions, and people are looking toward technology to 
assist. 
As the medical field is using more and more technology, device communication and 
interoperability is becoming more critical. As this communication and network 
connectivity is ubiquitous and growing, medical and healthcare technology security and 
privacy needs to be addressed. We can no longer afford to think of medical devices as 
isolated and siloed. Health information technology should be viewed holistically and 
tested as a system, not as individual components. 
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Other industries, such as automotive, have recently begun to make extensive use of 
technology and have paid a great deal of attention to security issues and are actively 
developing and implementing comprehensive testing frameworks. The automotive 
industry focus on testing is not only advancing the technology itself, it is also promoting 
sense of priority and security as a required ongoing process. 
The increased use of Bluetooth Low Energy medical devices and sensors warrants 
additional security research and testing. There is an opportunity to be proactive in the 
security process by establishing a BLE testing lab environment and using existing 
frameworks and best practices for robust testing of the technology that includes security 
risk prevention, detection, monitoring, and response. 
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4 Goals 
The goal of this report is to provide a literature review on the current state of security and 
privacy of medical devices and sensors with Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). 
4.1 General argument 
After a review of the available material, the following premises and conclusion are 
apparent: 
• Technology including medical devices and sensors is an integral part of the 
diagnosis, monitoring, and treatment in healthcare; 
• The use of medical devices and sensors in healthcare is growing; 
• Bluetooth Low Energy is increasingly being used in medical devices and sensors; 
• Security and privacy are important, especially in healthcare technology that can 
impact morbidity; 
• And therefore, there is an increasing need to evaluate the security and privacy of 
healthcare technology, particularly medical devices and sensors that use BLE. 
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5 Discussion 
There are many security issues with using BLE in medical devices and sensors that could 
lead to a breach of privacy or even affect patient morbidity. 
5.1 BLE use in medical devices and sensors 
When medical devices implement a standardized communication method like Bluetooth, 
there are benefits and risks. The benefits are using an established protocol for exchanging 
information with other devices that adhere to the same protocol provides compatibility 
and interoperability. The drawback, however, is that if a vulnerability is found with a 
method or system that is shared with many devices because of this standardized 
communication - then all interconnected devices are potentially at risk. 
The use of BLE for medical devices and sensor communication is increasing. According 
to medical device company Orthogonal: "Bluetooth technologies are the most widely 
used form of medical device connectivity."[33] BLE technologies are designed to work in 
the medical, healthcare, sports and fitness sector with premade health profiles for use 
when designing devices.[34] BLE as the name implies also has very low energy 
consumption (from 1/2 to 1/100th) when compared to Bluetooth BR/EDR, with certain 
BLE devices lasting 1-2 years on a single 1000mAh battery.[35] 
However, despite the publicity and promotion of BLE for medical devices, Bluetooth 
doesn't work well in implantable devices. This is due to the 2.4GHz frequency range used 
in Bluetooth, not because of the low power in BLE.[36] From the article: 
Both Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy have limited implantable medical 
device applications because they use 2.4GHz radio frequency and cannot 
penetrate well into human tissue.  
Additionally, there are potential security issues with the way that BLE devices pair and 
connect with each other. With BLE there are four modes of authentication that provide 
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pairing methods and setup BLE connections that are secure. The four modes are: Just 
Works™, Out of Band (OOB) pairing, Passkey, and Numeric Comparison. However, 
each of these methods have potential issues that could be exploited.  
Just Works™ uses elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange providing a 
secure method of secret key exchange and agreement, but even when using ECDH, there 
is a possibility of Man in the Middle attacks. From the "Basic Introduction to BLE 
Security" document [37] 
Just WorksTM: 
Once the devices exchange their public keys, the non-initiating device will 
generate a nonce, which is essentially a random seed value, and then use it to 
generate a confirmation value Cb. It then sends the Cb along with the nonce to the 
initiating device. At the same time, the initiating device generates its own nonce 
and sends it to the non-initiating device. The initiating device then uses the non-
initiating device’s nonce to generate its own confirmation value Ca which should 
match Cb. If the confirmation values match, then the connection proceeds. 
By virtue of the ECDH key exchange, the Just WorksTM pairing method in LE 
Secure Connections has substantially more resilience to passive eavesdropping 
compared to the same method in LE Legacy Connections. However, since this 
method does not give the user a way to verify the authenticity of the connection, it 
is still vulnerable to MITM attacks. 
Out of band (OOB) pairing is a method whereby the devices do not use Bluetooth at all 
for pairing, but some other (wireless) connection method for the initial setup and pairing 
of devices. OOB can provide protection against a potentially malicious third party 
listening to the pairing process or impersonating a legitimate device to perform a man in 
the middle (MitM) attack, but only if the (non-Bluetooth) wireless connection is not 
subject to third-party packet sniffing. [37] 
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Out of Band (OOB) Pairing: 
In OOB pairing, the public keys, nonces and confirmation values are all 
exchanged via a different wireless technology such as NFC. As in LE Legacy 
connections, OOB pairing only provides protection from passive eavesdropping 
and MITM attacks if the OOB channel is secure. 
There is also a passkey method where an identical key is manually entered on both 
devices. The obvious drawback here for medical devices and sensors is the lack of any 
type of input method or display on the device itself. 
Passkey: 
In this method, an identical 6 digit number is input into each of the devices. The 
two devices use this passkey, the public keys they exchanged earlier, and a 128-
bit nonce to authenticate the connection. This process is done bit by bit for every 
bit of the passkey. One device will compute a confirmation value for one bit of 
the passkey and reveal it to the other device. The other device will then compute 
its own confirmation value for the first bit of its passkey and reveal it to the first 
device. This process continues until all the bits of the passkey has been exchanged 
and verified to match. 
Due to the process detailed above, the passkey method for LE Secure Connections 
is much more resilient to MITM attacks than it is in LE Legacy connections. 
Finally, there is the numeric comparison method that uses the same method as Just 
Works™ but adds an additional confirmation code step at the end for verification. This 
confirmation code would eliminate a third party posing as a legitimate device, but this 
method is not well suited for medical devices due to lack of displays. 
Numeric Comparison:  
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This pairing method follows the exact same procedure as the Just WorksTM 
pairing method, but adds another step at the end. Once the devices confirm that 
the confirmation values match, then both devices will independently generate a 
final 6 digit confirmation value using both of the nonces. They both then display 
their calculated values to the user. The user then manually checks that both values 
match and ok’s the connection. This extra step allows this pairing method to 
provide protection from MITM attacks. 
Considering all 4 methods for use in medical devices and sensors, there is no ideal 
choice. OOB paring requires additional wireless communication channels and therefore 
additional circuitry, power consumption, and expense to the device. Passkey and Numeric 
comparison methods require user input and output on the device making it impractical for 
medical equipment. This leaves the Just Works™ method for pairing which is potentially 
vulnerable to MitM attacks. [37]. From the "A Basic Introduction to BLE Security" 
document on "Practical Considerations Concerning BLE Pairing Methods:" 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that most devices will use the passkey 
method or Just WorksTM, which means that most devices will have some degree 
of vulnerability. Designers working on products with high-security requirements, 
such as medical devices, should consider other wireless protocols if OOB pairing 
or Numeric Comparison cannot be implemented in their designs. 
5.1.1 BLE security risks 
There are currently many security risks associated with Bluetooth Low Energy. Some of 
these risks include Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks, replay attacks, and network 
communication decryption. 
Many devices do not properly implement BLE link layer encryption. A recent survey 
found that 8 of 10 devices did not implement proper BLE encryption.[38][39] 
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Even with encryption, many BLE devices are still susceptible to Man in the Middle 
(MitM) attacks where a malicious third party impersonates a legitimate device and can 
intercept and decrypt BLE network traffic.[40] MitM attacks can include Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks making resources unavailable, spoofing data values, capturing 
data, or even taking control of devices. 
There are several software packages available that can be used to perform MitM attacks 
on BLE, and there are additional tools to scan, capture, process and transmit BLE 
packets. For this paper, the focus is on open source software packages that can be run on 
low cost hardware and open source Linux systems.  
BLE MitM software tools: 
GATTattacker - The tool creates exact copy of attacked device in Bluetooth layer, and 
then tricks mobile application to interpret its broadcasts and connect to it instead the 
original device. At the same time, it keeps active connection to the device, and forwards 
to it the data exchanged with mobile application. In this way, acting as “Man-in-the-
Middle,” it is possible to intercept and/or modify the transmitted requests and responses. 
[41] 
BTLEjuice - BtleJuice is a complete framework to perform Man-in-the-Middle attacks on 
Bluetooth Smart devices (also known as Bluetooth Low Energy). It is composed of: an 
interception core, an interception proxy, a dedicated web interface, Python and Node.js 
bindings. BtleJuice is composed of two main components: an interception proxy and a 
core. These two components are required to run on independent machines in order to 
operate simultaneously two Bluetooth 4.0+ adapters.[42] 
Additional BLE software tools: 
hcitool - hcitool is used to configure Bluetooth connections and send some special 
command to Bluetooth devices. [43] 
BLEah - A BLE scanner for "smart" devices hacking based on the bluepy library. [44] 
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gatttool - Writing and transmitting BLE data and attributes can be accomplished using 
gatttool. [45] 
pygatt - Python wrapper for gatttool.[46] 
CrackLE - crackle cracks Bluetooth Smart (BLE) encryption. It exploits a flaw in the 
pairing mechanism that leaves all communications vulnerable to decryption by passive 
eavesdroppers.[47] 
Wireshark: Wireshark is the world’s foremost and widely-used network protocol 
analyzer. It lets you see what’s happening on your network at a microscopic level and is 
the de facto (and often de jure) standard across many commercial and non-profit 
enterprises, government agencies, and educational institutions.[48] 
BLE hardware tools: 
Capturing raw BLE wireless packets for reconnaissance could be accomplished using 
Wireshark BLE header dissector and an open source hardware BLE device like Ubertooth 
One. 
Ubertooth One: Project Ubertooth is an open source wireless development platform 
suitable for Bluetooth experimentation. Ubertooth ships with a capable BLE (Bluetooth 
Smart) sniffer and can sniff some data from Basic Rate (BR) Bluetooth Classic 
connections.[49] 
Devices also need to be have BLE available. A popular USB component to add BLE are 
USB dongles based on the CSR 8510 chip made by Qualcomm.[50] 
5.1.2 BLE security risk mitigation 
Medical devices and sensors like most any other technology, have the ability to accept 
inputs and provide outputs and should have the capability to be monitored and updated 
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through a communication channel. These are all potential attack vectors that can be 
vulnerable to exploits and present risks. 
The current security testing as outlined in the FDA guidance for medical devices and 
sensors is not adequate. Medical devices can pass FDA guidelines while still not 
following the security process of prevention, detection, and constant monitoring and 
response to threats with updates to prevent issues in the future. This is because the FDA 
guidance is for code review and checks for bugs in software. This type of review doesn't 
account for different types of attacks listed below: [51] 
Information harvesting - data is collected during network transit. 
Tracking the patient - using information such as GPS to monitor a persons movements 
and identify physical locations. 
Impersonation (MitM) - A malicious user places themselves in the middle of 
communication between two other devices, impersonating a legitimate device then 
intercepting and redirecting information to the intended device. 
Relaying attacks - similar to a MitM attack, a malicious user has access to both the 
legitimate sender and receiver and can collect information from the sender and relay that 
information to the receiver at a distance. 
Privilege escalation: Hack one hospital device, now have gained a foothold to hack other 
devices.   
Backdoor: hack one controller device to insert a backdoor on every medical device it 
updates. 
Replay attack: where data is captured and replayed with or without modification. 
Denial of service (DoS): make the devices unavailable for legitimate use by depleting 
resources. 
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Wireless decryption: capturing enough wireless data to detect patterns and decrypt 
sensitive data. 
Many of these type of attacks can be mitigated by properly implementing strong session 
key exchange encryption and/or using an out of band (OOB) session key exchange where 
the key is transferred by another (secure) means outside of Bluetooth. 
There is additional security auditing that needs to be done on medical devices and 
sensors. Fortunately, there are cybersecurity frameworks provided by NIST and 
HITRUST that outlines additional steps to improve the security process. 
Recently, three frameworks have been developed to address cybersecurity risks and 
vulnerabilities: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance and 
recommendations, the Health Information Trust Alliance Cybersecurity Framework 
(HITRUST CSF), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity 
Framework (NIST CSF). The FDA and HITRUST frameworks address medical devices 
and healthcare specifically. 
FDA - In December 2016, the FDA released a document that contains the guidance and 
recommendations for “managing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities for marked and 
distributed medical devices.” Additionally, there is an FDA guidance for “Radio 
Frequency Wireless Technology in Medical Devices” issues in August 2013. 
HITRUST - HITRUST has developed a healthcare-specific security and privacy 
framework (the HITRUST CSF). “HITRUST CSF provides organizations with the 
needed structure relating to information security tailored to the healthcare industry.” 
NIST - The NIST Cybersecurity Framework - “This voluntary Framework consists of 
standards, guidelines, and best practices to manage cybersecurity-related risk.” 
According to the Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force for the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) in a June 2017 report to Congress on Improving 
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Cybersecurity in the Health Care Industry, “Healthcare cybersecurity is in critical 
condition.”[52] 
“The report makes clear that there are many steps which public and private 
partners must take to continue this progress. An important first step is to leverage 
the work HITRUST has done in developing a healthcare-specific security and 
privacy framework (the HITRUST CSF) and fully support the work the 
Healthcare and Public Health Sector Coordinating Council (HPH-SCC) has 
completed (with HITRUST) in developing a healthcare-specific implementation 
guide of the NIST Framework,” the organization stated. 
5.1.3 BLE additional testing 
Additionally, a BLE testing environment could be developed using low cost and open 
source hardware and software. 
This testing environment would follow FDA guidance and the NIST and HITRUST 
cybersecurity frameworks. 
While these frameworks provide a very comprehensive overview of cybersecurity and 
methods to meet compliance requirements, there is still a need to develop standardized 
security testing (and possibly even certification) for medical devices and sensors. This 
paper will propose a practical and low-cost BLE experimental setup that fits within the 
framework, guidance, and recommendations set forth by the FDA , HITRUST and NIST 
organizations. 
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6 Conclusions 
Technology including medical devices and sensors that use BLE is an integral part of the 
diagnosis and treatment in healthcare, and the use of medical devices and sensors in 
healthcare is growing. 
Security and privacy are important, especially when dealing with personal information 
and with healthcare technology that can impact morbidity.  
Medical devices and sensors using BLE need improved comprehensive security testing to 
ensure the security, privacy, health, safety, and well-being of patients. Testing is also 
needed for the clinical trust and acceptance for use, and to promote interoperability, 
efficiency and cost savings. 
More could be done about the security of BLE medical devices and sensors including 
more definitive testing on BLE devices, development of a testing environment for 
evaluating BLE hardware and software with procedures that fit within FDA guidance and 
also the HITRUST and NIST cybersecurity frameworks. 
6.1 Future work 
There are many additional areas of BLE security and privacy research that could be 
explored. Two areas are developing a BLE testing environment lab setup and 
understanding how BLE security analysis fits into recently developed cybersecurity 
frameworks and guidance for medical devices. 
6.1.1 Testing environment 
Future work could include designing and implementing a low-cost testing environment 
using commercial off the shelf components and open source software to perform security 
testing and vulnerability assessment on BLE systems. 
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An example testing environment might include hardware components such as: 
Raspberry Pi - The Raspberry Pi is a tiny and affordable computer that you can use to 
learn programming through fun, practical projects.[53] 
Ubertooth One - Project Ubertooth is an open source wireless development platform 
suitable for Bluetooth experimentation. Ubertooth ships with a capable BLE (Bluetooth 
Smart) sniffer and can sniff some data from Basic Rate (BR) Bluetooth Classic 
connections. [49] 
There are also many opensource operating systems and software packages designed for 
security analysis. This software includes: 
Kali Linux - an Advanced Penetration Testing Linux distribution used for Penetration 
Testing, Ethical Hacking and network security assessments. [54] 
Wireshark. [48] 
GATTattacker .[41] 
BTLEjuice [42] 
Frameworks and guidance 
The FDA guidance for managing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices, the 
HITRUST and NIST cybersecurity frameworks are complex documents meant to 
encompass many different scenarios of devices, vulnerabilities, attacks and other 
situations. 
A practical guide could be constructed specifically for testing BLE medical devices and 
sensors that maps to these frameworks and guidance. This would both promote the 
proposed testbed and leverage the work already done by HITRUST, NIST and the FDA. 
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